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Gwadar Port Highlights Precarity In Pakistan’s Geopolitical Balancing Act – Analysis

By Muneeb Yousuf Eight months after the February 2024 general elections, Pakistan’s politics continue to be marred by political, economic and security challenges. The country’s most popular politician, Imran Khan, remains in jail, the coalition government lacks legitimacy and the military establishment continues to hold veto power over the government’s policies.  Pakistan is also facing acute security challenges. Terrorist attacks have increased in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan since October, targeting Chinese nationals working on critical infrastructure projects.  In September 2024, leaked military and diplomatic documents claiming that Pakistan has privately agreed to grant China approval for a military base at the strategic port of Gwadar in Balochistan surfaced. Both Pakistan and China have denied these claims, but the accusation sheds light on Pakistan’s internal security problems and its delicate relations with China and the United States. Pakistan’s foreign policy is under significant economic and geopolitical pressure. While Islamabad shares longstanding military and investment ties with Washington, it has also cultivated a strong relationship with Beijing predicated on mutual animosity toward New Delhi.  US–Pakistan relations have deteriorated since the 2020–21 US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Pakistani government and military’s attempts to repair ties with the United States have failed to yield meaningful dividends, such as securing a crucial International Monetary Fund (IMF) package. These diplomatic manoeuvres have visibly frustrated China, which views such overtures as a potential shift in allegiance to Washington.  Pakistan’s motivation behind potentially approving a military base would stem from the country’s economic and security problems. Reliance on IMF loans to keep the economy afloat, mounting debt repayments and persistent difficulties to raise capital have pushed Pakistan to renegotiate loan terms with China. Unlike previous years when Pakistan extracted strategic rent from the United States which paid for its exports and military modernisation, the country now finds its geopolitical significance substantially diminished.  If Pakistan were to grant a military base to China, it would face a dilemma. Beijing’s access to the base could alleviate Pakistan’s economic crisis and ensure that a continuous supply of advanced military hardware enters the country. But it would also lead to further deterioration of ties with the United States and affect Pakistan’s strategic autonomy.  If a military base were to be approved, internal security challenges would also be exacerbated. Baloch insurgents and other militant groups could be encouraged to increase attacks targeting Chinese nationals and development infrastructure. The Balochistan Liberation Army views the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor as a mechanism which furthers the economic marginalisation of the Baloch community. Baloch insurgents could exploit the situation to strengthen regional sentiments, which have long viewed the Pakistani state as unfairly appropriating mineral and gas reserves.  Rising attacks on Chinese infrastructure projects and workers have prompted Beijing to push for joint military mechanisms with Pakistan to safeguard Chinese citizens and projects in the country. Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong has maintained that security threats are the primary constraint behind the slow progress of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and has exhorted the Pakistani government to strengthen the security of Chinese personnel, institutions and projects.  But this push is unlikely to lead to a resolution, as there is little clarity on the role of Chinese guards in Pakistan if joint security were to be implemented and whether they would be able to participate in combat operations in case of attack.  There would be a score of foreign policy and internal security implications for Pakistan if the claims made by the Drop Site portal — based on leaked military and diplomatic documents — are accepted at face value. The aim is not to assess the merits of these claims, but to speculate about what implications such developments may have upon Pakistan’s relationship with the United States, China and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.  Given this, it would not be prudent for Pakistan to take sides in the US–China rivalry, which is set to intensify with the re-election of former US president Donald Trump. Islamabad is not a likely priority for the Trump cabinet, yet Washington would not wish for Islamabad to fall into Beijing’s lap. About the author: Muneeb Yousuf is Deputy Editor of South Asia Research and a non-resident fellow at the Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies. Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum